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The Shared Prosperity Fund is expected to replace EU Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF) in the UK.  ESIF funds come in two parts: the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF).  A majority of funds are targeted at regions 
whose GDP per capita (calculated from GVA per capita) is below 75% of the European 
average, of which the UK has two – Cornwall & Scilly and West Wales & The 
Valleys[1].  Additionally, so-called “transition” regions with GDP per capita of under 90% of 
the EU average have greater flexibility in terms of how they can spend such monies and, in 
practice, applications under the schemes are often looked upon more favourably than many 
“more developed” regions. 
Our forthcoming book, examines this metric in detail and suggests better 
alternatives.  GVA/capita is a flawed metric and the Shared Prosperity Fund offers the 
chance to move to something better (irrespective of what happens with Brexit – these 
themes are fundamental).  As such, our book is split into three parts: 
1. Thinking inside the box: A review of work already done critiquing GVA/capita. We 
show it is a nonsense measure because it divides the amount produced by people 
working in a region by the number living in a region.  In the West Midlands, the West 
Midlands Combined Authority (coterminous with the old West Midlands 
metropolitan county) attracts commuters and this artificially inflates its 
GVA/capita.  London experiences the same phenomenon writ large.  Better 
measures already produced by the ONS are: 
a) GDHI/Capita (total income per capita of residents) 
b) GVA/Hour (the amount produced per hour worked – i.e. productivity) 
2. Thinking outside the box: Even these official data are not appropriate when examining 
regional disparities. Why?  Prices differ across the UK.  International comparisons (including 
within the EU) take this into account: proper regional measures should do the same.  After a 
discussion of how best to do this, we show that: 
a) After adjusting for price differences, incomes per person are actually lower in many parts 
of the Midlands than in the North. For example, incomes in the West Midlands Combined 
Authority (WMCA) are considerably lower than any other comparable city-region using our 
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data.  In fact, if this were the eligibility criteria used, the WMCA would receive the most 
funding (by a margin) of any NUTS2 region in the UK, rather than being treated as a “more 
developed” region as it currently is. 
b) London’s towering productivity advantage over other regions is much smaller than 
hitherto believed. By this measure, workers in the North East and North West don’t perform 
badly.  Some areas exhibit a substantial disparity between productivity and income, which is 
driven by: 
(i) Low employment levels of residents 
(ii) High-productivity, high-skill individuals commuting into the city-region 
from         surrounding areas (think Warwick, Lichfield etc.) 
3. Finally, a consideration of the policy ramifications of the above. Specifically, 
a) The need for a targeted “social fund” to – at a minimum – replace the ESF. This could 
include measures that address the issues that cause (and are associated with) poverty and 
low incomes with a particular focus on employability and precarious employment or 
underemployment. 
 
b) The need to redirect investment funding away from London and the Golden Triangle 
(London-Cambridge-Oxford). Traditionally, London has been seen as hyper-successful and 
therefore investment in publically-funded infrastructure has responded to perceived 
economic need.  Our figures fundamentally undermine this, suggesting that other regions 
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are underfunded relative to London.  Specifically, we criticise thinking based on nominal 
productivity differences when real productivity differences are what should be of interest. 
Per capita funding (£) for transport and education, UK Government Office Regions (2016-
17)[i] 
Government Office 
Region 
Transport Education 
North East 291 1,272 
North West 370 1,276 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber 
335 1,280 
East Midlands 220 1,244 
West Midlands 314 1,286 
East 333 1,266 
London 944 1,605 
South East 370 1,205 
South West 305 1,190 
Scotland 620 1,512 
Wales 377 1,345 
Northern Ireland 307 1,459 
      
c) Finally, we argue that greater devolution of powers is a necessary precondition to solve 
many of the issues raised by Brexit. The Brexit vote was highly region-specific and our 
response to it must go beyond simply doling out money to giving regions real authority over 
how to spend it (as Scotland does).  Scotland is a useful case-study: whilst productivity in the 
rest of the UK has stagnated in the past decade, Scotland’s onshore economy has enjoyed 
continued growth.  Given that our figures show that in real terms Scotland is more 
productive than the South East of England, there is a strong argument to be made in favour 
of devolving greater powers to the English regions. 
1. European Commission. Is My Region Covered? 2014; Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/how/is-my-region-covered/. 
[i] HM Treasury (2018): Country and Regional Analysis, accessed on August 17th 2018 
at:  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/country-and-regional-analysis-2017 see 
‘Country and Regional Analysis 2017: A Tables’. 
